Monday, May 20, 2019
Manila Motor Company Essay
In May 1954, Manila Motor Compevery filed in the Municipal Court of Manila a unhealthiness to recover from Manuel T. Flores the amount of P1,047.98 as chattel mortgage installments which fell due in September 1941. defendant pleaded prescriptionchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 1941 to 1954. The complaint was dismissed. On appeal, the Court of First Instance saw differently, sustaining Plaintiffs brawl that the moratorium laws had interrupted the running of the prescriptive period, and that deducting the age during which said laws were in operation three years and octette months 1 the ten-year term had not yet elapsed when complainant sued for collection in May 1954. whence said court ordered the return of the case to the municipal judge for trial on the merits. defendant appealed.IssueWhether or not the moratorium laws did not have the effect of suspending the period of limitations, because they were unconstitutional, as declared by this court in Rutter vs. Esteban, 49 Off.HeldIn Montilla vs. Pacific Commercial SC held that the moratorium laws suspended the period of prescription. That was rendered later the Rutter-Esteban decision. It should be stated however, in fairness to Appellant, that the Montilla decision came down after he had submitted his brief. And in dish up to his main contention, the following portion is quoted from a resolution of this Court. Rutter vs. Esteban (93 Phil., 68) may be construed to mean that at the time of the decision the Moratorium law could no longer be validly applied because of the prevailing circumstances. At any rate, although the general rule is that an unconstitutional statuteconfers no right, creates no office, affords no protection and justifies no acts performed downstairs it. (11 Am. Jur., pp. 828, 829.) There are several instances wherein courts, out of equity, have relaxed its operation (cf. notes in Cooleys Constitutional Limitations eighth ed., p. 383 and Notes 53 A. L. R., 273) or qualified its effects sinc e the actual existence of a statute prior to such declaration is an operative fact, and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored (Chicot County vs. Baster, 308 U. S., 371) and a realistic get along is eroding the general doctrine (Warring vs. Colpoys, 136 Am. Law Rep., 1025, 1030). Judgment affirmed, without costs.
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